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BC 1claw

HSM-backed secret management for AI agents — store, retrieve, rotate, and share secrets via the 1Claw vault without exposing them in context.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Kevin J v1.1.1 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 13 303 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token EXAMPLES.md:103
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    → simulate_transaction(to: "0x00…EaD", value: "0.01", chain: "base")
    fixturequoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token EXAMPLES.md:117
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    → submit_transaction(to: "0x00…EaD", value: "0.01", chain: "base", simulate_first: true)
    fixturequoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:156
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://api.…xyz/v1/vaults
    vendor-host

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 13303 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 13303 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 61 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (10 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 141: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 58 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 61 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
1Claw is a disclosed secret-vault integration with powerful but purpose-aligned vault, sharing, and transaction-signing features that should be installed with tightly scoped access.
LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026