SKILLEMALL.ai

BC qa-agent-testing

当需要测试 AI Agent(智能体、聊天机器人、AI 助手)时使用此技能。Agent 测试和传统功能测试完全不同——你要测的不是"点按钮看结果",而是它的推理链路、工具调用时机、幻觉率、Prompt 注入防护、角色边界保持和记忆一致性。安全三维(安全/高级安全/可控性)对任何 Agent 都是必选项,其余六维按 Agent 类型与风险追加。输出九维测试矩阵、工具调用与幻觉专项用例、安全审计清单。 触发场景:Agent测试、智能体测试、AI助手、聊天机器人、Agent幻觉、Prompt注入、AI安全审计、LLM测试、需要测试AI Agent或评估AI行为时。 Use when the user asks about: AI agent, LLM, or chatbot testing — tool-calling behavior, hallucination rates, prompt injection defense, role-boundary keeping, and memory consistency.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: kokxi v1.8.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 614 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 16 d ago

当需要测试 AI Agent(智能体、聊天机器人、AI 助手)时使用此技能。Agent 测试和传统功能测试完全不同——你要测的不是"点按钮看结果",而是它的推理链路、工具调用时机、幻觉率、Prompt 注入防护、角色边界保持和记忆一致性。安全三维(安全/高级安全/可控性)对任何 Agent 都是必选项,其余六维按…

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob Bash WebFetch

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 10 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 614 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 465: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a text-only AI agent testing guide with no hidden execution, persistence, or data-exfiltration behavior found.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 Sept 2026