SKILLEMALL.ai

BC qa-api-testing

当需要测试 RESTful/GraphQL/gRPC/WebSocket 等 API 时使用此技能。覆盖接口的功能验证、参数组合、鉴权绕过、超时重试、幂等性、接口契约和向后兼容性。不要只测 HTTP 状态码——真正的接口 Bug 往往在数据结构不一致、字段类型不匹配、空值处理和并发调用上。输出接口测试矩阵、契约断言清单和工具选型建议。 触发场景:接口测试、API测试、接口自动化、RESTful测试、GraphQL测试、gRPC测试、契约测试、接口安全测试、需要测试API时。 Use when the user asks about: API testing for REST, GraphQL, gRPC, WebSocket, SOAP, and webhook endpoints — contract validation, auth bypass, idempotency, timeout and retry behavior, and backward compatibility.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: kokxi v1.8.0 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 875 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 5 d ago

当需要测试 RESTful/GraphQL/gRPC/WebSocket 等 API 时使用此技能。覆盖接口的功能验证、参数组合、鉴权绕过、超时重试、幂等性、接口契约和向后兼容性。不要只测 HTTP 状态码——真正的接口 Bug…

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Read Grep Glob Bash WebFetch

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 6 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 875 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 450: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a coherent API testing guidance skill with defensive QA content and no evidence of hidden execution, persistence, exfiltration, or destructive behavior.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 Sept 2026