DC forge-autonomous-agent-v1
(no description)
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 9
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 9
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostprompts/setup.md:51Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/[USERNAME]/forge/main/install.sh | bash
-
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlprompts/setup.md:272Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot[TOKEN]/sendMessage" \
quoted -
medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlprompts/setup.md:286Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot[TOKEN]/setMyCommands" \
quoted -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcprompts/setup.md:473Writes to a shell startup fileecho '[ -f ~/.forge/.env ] && source ~/.forge/.env' >> ~/.bashrc
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcprompts/setup.md:475Writes to a shell startup fileecho '[ -f ~/.forge/.env ] && source ~/.forge/.env' >> ~/.zshrc 2>/dev/null || true
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-hostREADME.md:28Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/$FORGE_GITHUB_USER/forge/main/install.sh | bash
-
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvprompts/setup.md:473Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition)echo '[ -f ~/.forge/.env ] && source ~/.forge/.env' >> ~/.bashrc
detector -
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvprompts/setup.md:475Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition)echo '[ -f ~/.forge/.env ] && source ~/.forge/.env' >> ~/.zshrc 2>/dev/null || true
detector -
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvprompts/system.md:26Reads a .env filesource ~/.forge/.env
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 4 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 168 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 3 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.