SKILLEMALL.ai

AB container-runtime-threat-model

Generate container runtime threat models analyzing attack surfaces across container components, images, privileges, network exposure, and security controls. Use when threat modeling containerized applications, Docker/containerd security review, container escape risk assessment, STRIDE analysis for containers, or cloud-native application security.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ToolWeb v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 2 683 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice

AnalyzerDockerInfrastructureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:34
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - User asks about container escape, privilege escalation, or image vulnerabilities
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:141
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Highlight critical threats (container escape, privilege escalation)
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:160
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      [Container escape, privilege escalation, etc.]

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 77 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2683 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 348: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 77 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill appears to do what it says: it sends container configuration details to ToolWeb to generate a threat model, so users should only submit information they are comfortable sharing.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026