AB k8s-incident-response-playbook
Generate Kubernetes incident response playbooks tailored to specific incident types, severity levels, and cluster configurations. Use when responding to K8s security incidents, container breaches, pod compromises, cryptomining attacks, privilege escalation, lateral movement, or building K8s IR procedures.
As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 7
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 7
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:9Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Privilege Escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityREADME.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Lateral Movement
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityskill-card.md:14Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)Security teams, incident responders, and Kubernetes operators use this skill to generate tailored response playbooks for cluster security incidents such as container compromise, cryptomining, privileg
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:3Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)description: Generate Kubernetes incident response playbooks tailored to specific incident types, severity levels, and cluster configurations. Use when responding to K8s security incidents, container
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:32Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- User mentions cryptomining, privilege escalation, or lateral movement in K8s
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:69Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- "Privilege Escalation" — Attacker gained elevated privileges
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:70Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- "Lateral Movement" — Attacker moving between pods/namespaces
quoted
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 81 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2635 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 306: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 13 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 81 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.