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FC async-queue

Schedule delayed tasks between OpenClaw agents — set reminders, chain tasks, coordinate agents on a delay. File-backed, no infra needed. NOT for cron-style recurring jobs (use openclaw cron) or immediate actions.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: ktech99 v1.0.6 MIT-0 12 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 193 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ReferenceAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
38/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
94
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/PROTOCOL.md:86
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload  ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.queue-daemon.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/PROTOCOL.md:87
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load    ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.queue-daemon.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:71
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$PLIST"
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:141
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload  ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.queue-daemon.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:142
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load    ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.queue-daemon.plist
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:17
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.queue-daemon.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:156
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation table row)
    | `~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.queue-daemon.plist` | launchd service |
    table

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "security_disclosure"

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1193 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 212: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 94.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill mostly does what it says, but it installs a persistent daemon and exposes a plugin-auth endpoint that can inject queued text into agent system events with weak target scoping.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026