SKILLEMALL.ai

AC openclaw-n8n-orchestrator

When the user wants to connect an OpenClaw agent to n8n workflows, create n8n webhook skills for OpenClaw, route agent API calls through n8n for credential isolation, build bidirectional OpenClaw-to-n8n pipelines, design the proxy orchestration pattern, deploy co-located Docker stacks, implement the n8n-claw architecture, or publish OpenClaw n8n skills to ClawHub — activate this skill. Also trigger for "openclaw webhook," "agent workflow automation," "credential isolation," "gateway ingress," "n8n proxy pattern," or when securing autonomous agent API access through deterministic orchestration.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Kristopher Dunham v2.0.0 MIT-0 13 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 913 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureZapierDockerInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/deployment.md:234
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | sh
      security skill
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/security.md:28
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
      **Vector 2: Prompt Injection → Lateral Movement**
      detector
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv templates/docker-compose.yml:8
      Reads a .env file (code comment)
      #   1. Copy .env.example to .env and fill in values
      comment

    A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 18 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 43 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3913 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 600: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 31 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 43 items
    • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a real OpenClaw-to-n8n integration helper, but it needs Review because it documents powerful autonomous gateway, memory, and workflow-generation patterns with under-scoped safety guidance.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026