SKILLEMALL.ai

DC multi-agent-brand-studio

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: kuannnn v1.0.3 MIT-0 46 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 627 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting

ProcedureAI and agentsMarketingInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump assets/workspace/HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (8) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    assets/workspace/HEARTBEAT.md, assets/workspace/IDENTITY.md, assets/workspace/SOUL.md, assets/workspace-creator/SOUL.md, assets/workspace-engineer/SOUL.md

Files scanned: 43. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 110 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3627 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 26 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 110 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill makes broad but disclosed OpenClaw setup changes for a persistent multi-agent brand workflow, and I found no artifact-backed deception, exfiltration, or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026