SKILLEMALL.ai

BD BloodHound Narrator

Turn BloodHound attack path exports into dual-layer security reports — CISO executive prose on top, technical remediation playbook below. Automates Active Directory audit reporting for pentesters, blue teams, and security consultants. Supports DCSync, Kerberoasting, AD CS abuse (ESC1/3/4/6/7/9/10/13, Golden Certificate), resource-based constrained delegation, shadow credentials, LAPS and gMSA password reads, ACL abuse, GPO takeover, and lateral movement paths. Pure local PowerShell — no API calls, no data leaves your machine. Air-gap compatible.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Kuro v1.0.2 MIT-0 12 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 739 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationData and analyticsInfrastructureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
86
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 14

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 14
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security CHANGELOG.md:20
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **Additional lateral movement edges** — `CanRDP`, `CanPSRemote`, `ExecuteDCOM`, `SQLAdmin`, `WriteSPN`, `WriteAccountRestrictions`.
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security CHANGELOG.md:30
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Lateral movement rebalanced: `AdminTo` and `HasSession` now score 3 each individually, and the combination bonus dropped from 10 to 5 to avoid double counting.
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security scripts/lib/NarrativeTemplates.txt:87
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    $lines.Add("*This path enables significant lateral movement or privilege escalation that could compromise sensitive business systems and data.*`n")
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security scripts/lib/NarrativeTemplates.txt:152
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    'Deploy Credential Guard on endpoints to prevent credential harvesting.'
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security scripts/lib/NarrativeTemplates.txt:211
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    'GenericWrite on a user permits SPN injection (targeted Kerberoasting) and shadow-credential attacks — treat as privilege escalation, not a write permission.'
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security scripts/lib/NarrativeTemplates.txt:421
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # ── v1.0.2: lateral movement ──
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security scripts/lib/NarrativeTemplates.txt:431
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    title   = 'Break the Lateral Movement Chain'
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security scripts/lib/SeverityClassifier.txt:103
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # ── Lateral movement ──
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security scripts/lib/SeverityClassifier.txt:386
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # ── Factor: lateral movement chain ──
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security scripts/lib/SeverityClassifier.txt:389
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    $reasons.Add('Lateral movement chain: local admin + session hijack enables credential theft')
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:3
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    description: Turn BloodHound attack path exports into dual-layer security reports — CISO executive prose on top, technical remediation playbook below. Automates Active Directory audit reporting for pe
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:21
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    **Detected attack patterns:** DCSync and directory replication rights, Kerberoasting, unconstrained delegation, resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD), shadow credentials (AddKeyCredentialLink),
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:88
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | Lateral movement chain (AdminTo + HasSession) | +5 |
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:154
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Post-pentest AD audit reporting

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "bins"

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (BloodHound Narrator) differs from the folder (bloodhound-narrator)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1739 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 551: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
BloodHound Narrator is a coherent local reporting tool that reads user-provided BloodHound JSON and writes a Markdown report without network use or persistence.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 26 Jul 2026