BC conto
Enforce fine-grained spending policies before executing any payment, transfer, swap, or bridge. Checks Conto policy engine for approval before money leaves your wallet. Use /conto to manage policies or check payments.
As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, consistency, running it twice
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: conto (ClawHub)
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenREADME.md:79High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)/conto check if a 10 pathUSD payment to 0x74…3a1 for API credits is allowed
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenREADME.md:166High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)/conto check if a 10 pathUSD payment to 0x74…3a1 for API credits is allowed
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenREADME.md:174High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)/conto check if a 500 pathUSD payment to 0x74…3a1 is allowed
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenREADME.md:190High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)/conto check if a 10 pathUSD payment to 0x74…3a1 for gambling is allowed
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenREADME.md:198High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)/conto check if a 600 pathUSD payment to 0x74…3a1 is allowed
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 7251 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (conto) differs from the folder (conto-hermes)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7251 tokens
- 85Steps. 65 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 11 branches, has a failure section
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 217: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 34 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 65 items
- +4Has examples (37 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent payment-policy skill, but it gives an agent live payment and policy-administration authority with weak local confirmation and credential-storage safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026