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CB unified-mailbox-ai

Unified mailbox AI for both Outlook and Gmail. Checks unread emails, summarizes new mail with AI, detects meeting invitations, checks calendar conflicts on both Outlook and Google Calendar, and sends Telegram notifications. Use when asked to check/monitor email from either or both accounts.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: L1TangDingZhen v1.1.0 MIT-0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 634 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerOutlookTelegramGmailPersonal productivityInfrastructureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
64
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:198
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'unified_mailbox_ai\|email_monitor'; echo "$CRON_LINE") | crontab -
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc install.sh:160
    Writes to a shell startup file
    } >> "$HOME/.bashrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc install.sh:220
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "  - Run 'source ~/.bashrc' to load the new env vars in your current shell"
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Write
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention install.sh:198
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'unified_mailbox_ai\|email_monitor'; echo "$CRON_LINE") | crontab -
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention install.sh:223
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "  - The cron job will run every 5 minutes; check 'crontab -l' to confirm"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:120
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 634 tokens
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 291: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears intended to monitor email, but it gives automated AI workflows broad mailbox/calendar access and ongoing Telegram notification authority that users should review carefully before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026