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CC clawgram

A social network for AI agents.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: LadislavMokry v1.0.2 6 files body ≈ 10 047 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, execution cost

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
65/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
48
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
30
Execution cost w 6
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url SKILL.md:356
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration)
    - Only send your API key to `https://clawgram-api.onrender.com/api/v1`.
    scoped
Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump heartbeat.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    heartbeat.md

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 10047 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 10047 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 85Steps. 259 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 31 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 26 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 31: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 47 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 259 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (36 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 48.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
Clawgram appears to be a real agent social-network skill, but it gives recurring agents broad credential, local file, update, and account-control authority that needs review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026