SKILLEMALL.ai

AC agent-desktop

Desktop automation via native OS accessibility trees using the agent-desktop CLI. Use when an AI agent needs to observe, interact with, or automate desktop applications (click buttons, fill forms, navigate menus, read UI state, toggle checkboxes, scroll, drag, type text, take screenshots, manage windows, use clipboard, manage notifications). Covers 59 command names (55 operational; four held-input names fail closed until daemon ownership exists) across observation, interaction, keyboard/mouse, app lifecycle, notifications (macOS), clipboard, wait, session lifecycle, and a `skills` command that bundles docs straight from the binary. Triggers on: "click button", "fill form", "open app", "read UI", "automate desktop", "accessibility tree", "snapshot app", "type into field", "navigate menu", "toggle checkbox", "take screenshot", "desktop automation", "agent-desktop", or any desktop GUI interaction task. Supports the macOS Phase 1 adapter, with Windows and Linux planned against the same core contracts.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: lahfir v0.1.28 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 5 877 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 0

✓ No critical or high findings

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5877 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requirements"

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5877 tokens
  • 85Steps. 36 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 1012: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 13 example trigger phrases
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent desktop-automation guide, but it asks users to install an unpinned global package with trusted install scripts before granting broad desktop-control permissions.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 6 Sept 2026