SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BF Ellya

OpenClaw virtual companion skill. Use it to bootstrap runtime files (SOUL and base image), guide user personalization, learn and store style prompts from uploaded photos, generate selfies from user prompts or autonomous style strategy, and generate a multi-pose photo series from a selected image.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: laogiant v1.0.2 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 2 642 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process F 41/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: assets/base.*, assets/base.<ext>, assets/base.<original_extension>

GeneratorAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
41/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: assets/base.*, assets/base.<ext>, assets/base.<original_extension>
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: Ellya (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/image_provider.py:202
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump templates/SOUL.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    templates/SOUL.md

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: assets/base.*
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: assets/base.<ext>
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: assets/base.<original_extension>

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: assets/base.*, assets/base.<ext>, assets/base.<original_extension>
  • 0Tools and files. 3 referenced file(s) missing: assets/base.*, assets/base.<ext>, assets/base.<original_extension>
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Ellya) differs from the folder (ellya-ootd)
  • 100Steps. 100 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 13 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2642 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (11 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 297: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 100 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent AI image companion skill, but it asks to analyze and store unusually sensitive appearance details from photos without enough consent, privacy, or deletion controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026