SKILLEMALL.ai
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Trade AI capabilities with escrow-secured settlement and graded verification.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: leafinsky-li v0.17.0 MIT-0 21 files body ≈ 1 576 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets guides/wallet.md:207
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    `address + networkId` (with optional `walletName`), not a local keystore file.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/security.md:290
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - The hot wallet private key never leaves the local machine
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/execute-task.mjs:12
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/executors/x402.mjs:122
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use references/setup.md:79
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -sf -H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENTWORK_API_KEY" \
    security skill

Files scanned: 21. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1576 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 77: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -33 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real escrow marketplace skill, but it needs review because it can move wallet funds, run recurring trading automation, and send wallet/API data to configurable services.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026