BF alist-cli
AList file management CLI for AI agents including Codex, Claude Code, and OpenClaw. Supports upload, download, list, mkdir, rm, mv, search, url. Auth via environment variables with auto-refresh. Trigger: file management, AList operations, upload/download.
As a process F 43/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: references/openapi.json
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcreferences/ONBOARDING.md:108Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export ALIST_URL="https://..."' >> ~/.bashrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcreferences/ONBOARDING.md:109Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export ALIST_USERNAME="xxx"' >> ~/.bashrc
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcreferences/ONBOARDING.md:110Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export ALIST_PASSWORD="xxx"' >> ~/.bashrc
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low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalscripts/alist_cli.py:391Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)password = args.args[1] if len(args.args) > 1 else os.environ.get(ENV_PASSWORD, "")
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: references/openapi.json - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "displayName"
Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100
- 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: references/openapi.json
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Steps. 30 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 922 tokens
- low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 255: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.