SKILLEMALL.ai

AC fetch-legionclaw-invite-code

Fetches Tongfudun LegionClaw usage-permission invite codes by POSTing JSON with userId set to the agentid (second colon-delimited segment) parsed from a LegionClaw session handle. Obtain the session handle from runtime injection or by querying the LegionClaw host or model; do not default to asking the user to paste it. Handles long session-handle forms (e.g. agent, agentid, openai-user, user suffix). Supports multiple codes per request by calling the API repeatedly; returns all codes in chat by default (files only if user explicitly asks). Designed for LegionClaw-hosted agents. Use when the user needs Tongfudun LegionClaw access invite codes, asks for fetch-legionclaw-invite-code, or says things like 邀请码, 要邀请码, 获取邀请码, 申请邀请码, 生成邀请码, 给我邀请码, 帮我生成邀请码, 发我邀请码, 多个邀请码, LegionClaw 邀请码, 通付盾邀请码, or LegionClaw 使用权限.

ClawHub Claude Code author: LegionSpace-Hackathon v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 210 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 34 h ago

Fetches Tongfudun LegionClaw usage-permission invite codes by POSTing JSON with userId set to the agentid (second colon-delimited segment) parsed from a…

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 1. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 49 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2210 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 815: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 49 items
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks the agent to retrieve hidden LegionClaw session metadata and use it to claim invite codes through an external API.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 8 Jul 2026