DC myclaw-backup
Backup and restore all OpenClaw configuration, agent memory, skills, and workspace data. Part of the MyClaw.ai (https://myclaw.ai/skills) open skills ecosystem — the AI personal assistant platform that gives every user a full server with complete code control. Use when the user wants to create a snapshot of their OpenClaw instance, schedule periodic backups, restore from a backup, migrate to a new server, download a backup file locally, upload a backup file from another machine, or protect against data loss. Includes a built-in HTTP server for browser-based download/upload/restore without needing cloud storage. TRUST BOUNDARY: This skill archives and restores highly sensitive data including bot tokens, API keys, and channel credentials. Only install if you trust the operator. Always use --dry-run before restore. Never start the HTTP server without a --token.
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 12
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/schedule.sh:33Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)EXISTING=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "openclaw-backup" || true)
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/schedule.sh:34Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)echo "$EXISTING" | crontab -
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/schedule.sh:50Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)EXISTING=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "openclaw-backup" || true)
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencescripts/schedule.sh:60Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)} | crontab -
Medium and low: 8
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-autorun-instructionSKILL.md:44Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session- Always run `restore.sh --dry-run` before applying a restore
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentionscripts/schedule.sh:4Mentions editing / listing crontab (code comment)# ⚠️ PERSISTENCE NOTICE: This script modifies your system crontab (crontab -e).
comment -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentionscripts/schedule.sh:33Mentions editing / listing crontabEXISTING=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "openclaw-backup" || true)
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentionscripts/schedule.sh:50Mentions editing / listing crontabEXISTING=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "openclaw-backup" || true)
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low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlscripts/serve.sh:64Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)echo " 🌐 Web UI: http://localhost:${PORT}/?token=…"placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlscripts/serve.sh:65Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)echo " 📥 Upload: POST http://localhost:${PORT}/upload?token=…"placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlscripts/serve.sh:66Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)echo " 📤 List: GET http://localhost:${PORT}/backups?token=…"placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlscripts/server.js:222Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)console.log(` http://localhost:${PORT}/?token=…);placeholder
Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Steps. 17 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1573 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 870: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
- +3All 5 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.