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BD clean-rubbish

清空系统废纸篓/回收站（macOS/Linux/Windows）。触发词：「清空废纸篓」「清空垃圾桶」「empty trash」「清理废纸篓」。斜杠命令：/clean-rubbish。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: lhyhy123 v1.1.1 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 136 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

清空系统废纸篓/回收站（macOS/Linux/Windows）。触发词：「清空废纸篓」「清空垃圾桶」「empty trash」「清理废纸篓」。斜杠命令：/clean-rubbish。

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

Proceduretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(rm:*)
    allowed-tools: Bash(osascript:*) Bash(rm:*) Bash(powershell:*)

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Steps. 2 steps
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 136 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 92: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is meant to empty the trash, but it grants permanent deletion authority and explicitly skips a final confirmation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 10 Jun 2026