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DC agent genesis

Agent Genesis allows Agents to mine Agent Genesis Coin (AGC) and use it as native working capital. Earn AGC through Proof of Agent (POA).

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: likwid-tech v1.0.0 MIT-0 21 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 704 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
51/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
35
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 14

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:27
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    bash <(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/likwid-fi/agent-genesis/refs/heads/main/bootstrap.sh)
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:35
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    bash <(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/likwid-fi/agent-genesis/refs/heads/main/bootstrap.sh)
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:46
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    bash <(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/likwid-fi/agent-genesis/refs/heads/main/bootstrap.sh)
Medium and low: 11
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security audit/AGC_SECURITY_AUDIT_v3.md:72
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    1. **Access control** — ownership, authorization, privilege escalation
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token genesis.js:41
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const AGC_TOKEN_ADDRESS = process.env.AGC_TOKEN_ADDRESS || "0x26…27A";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token genesis.js:42
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const AGENT_PAYMASTER_ADDRESS = process.env.AGENT_PAYMASTER_ADDRESS || "0xBe…7e3";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token genesis.js:44
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const SIMP…ION = "0xa4…6B5";
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token genesis.js:47
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    const LIKWID_HELPER_ADDRESS = process.env.LIKWID_HELPER_ADDRESS || "0x16…510";
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:127
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | Agent Paymaster | `0xBe…7e3` |
    table
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:128
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | LikwidVault | `0x06…4Ba` |
    table
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:129
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
    | LikwidPairPosition | `0xB3…BCD` |
    table
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:130
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | LikwidMarginPosition | `0x6b…be8` |
    detectortable
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:131
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | LikwidLendPosition | `0xCE…18E` |
    detectortable
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:127
    Reads a .env file
    cd ~/.openclaw/skills/agent-genesis && cat .env 2>/dev/null | grep -q MODEL_KEY && echo "configured" || echo "not configured"

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (agent genesis) differs from the folder (agent-genesis)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3704 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (42 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -243 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 137: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 28 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
  • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a disclosed crypto wallet and mining tool, but it also installs broad mainnet DeFi and margin-trading powers through a mutable remote installer, so it belongs in Review.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026