CC linkfox-amazon-store-listings
亚马逊店铺 Listing 与刊登相关定义/限制（与 linkfox-amazon-store-auth / linkfox-amazon-store-report 同系列），经 LinkFox /spApi/developerProxy 调用 SP-API：Listings Items（get/search/patch/put/delete）、Listings Restrictions（getListingsRestrictions）、Product Type Definitions（searchDefinitionsProductTypes、getDefinitionsProductType）。当用户提到获取或删除 Listing、刊登限制、ASIN 能否卖、product type 定义、JSON Schema 刊登属性、searchDefinitionsProductTypes、getDefinitionsProductType、getListingsRestrictions、Listings Restrictions、亚马逊刊登列表 时触发。
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/delete_listings_item.py:42Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/get_definitions_product_type.py:41Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/get_listings_item.py:45Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/get_listings_restrictions.py:41Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/patch_listings_item.py:47Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/put_listings_item.py:46Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/search_definitions_product_types.py:44Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/search_listings_items.py:42Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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low Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcreferences/onboarding.md:13Writes to a shell startup file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- macOS zsh：`echo 'export LINKFOX_AGENT_API_KEY="<key>"' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc`
quoted -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcreferences/onboarding.md:14Writes to a shell startup file (detector / deny-list definition)- Linux bash：`echo 'export LINKFOX_AGENT_API_KEY="<key>"' >> ~/.bashrc && source ~/.bashrc`
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/onboarding.py:49High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)or "eyJh…iJ9")
quoted
Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 15 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 31 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2542 tokens
- low The response is described with custom markup (8 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -32 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 483: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 19 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.