SKILLEMALL.ai

BC linkfox-fastmoss-product-search

基于FastMoss数据搜索和筛选TikTok全球电商商品,支持关键词搜索、多维度筛选(类目、店铺类型、佣金率、销量、达人数等)和排序。当用户提到TikTok选品、TikTok商品搜索、TikTok产品数据、TikTok达人带货、TikTok佣金率、TikTok爆款追踪、TikTok GMV分析、TikTok product search, TikTok product research, TikTok creator sales, TikTok commission rate, TikTok GMV analysis, FastMoss时触发此技能。即使用户未明确提及"FastMoss",只要其需求涉及在TikTok平台搜索商品数据或分析商品表现,也应触发此技能。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: linkfox-ai v1.0.6 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 2 373 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerMarketingtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/onboarding.md:13
    Writes to a shell startup file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - macOS zsh:`echo 'export LINKFOX_AGENT_API_KEY="<key>"' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc`
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/onboarding.md:14
    Writes to a shell startup file (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Linux bash:`echo 'export LINKFOX_AGENT_API_KEY="<key>"' >> ~/.bashrc && source ~/.bashrc`
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/onboarding.py:49
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    or "eyJh…iJ9")
    quoted

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 100Steps. 30 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2373 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 337: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches a paid TikTok product-search tool, but it also includes under-scoped account, credential, payment, feedback, and persistence behaviors that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 14 Aug 2026