SKILLEMALL.ai

BB setup-openviking-remote

Install and configure the OpenViking long-term memory plugin for OpenClaw via natural conversation. Covers the full lifecycle: environment check, plugin install, remote-mode config, health verification, and gateway activation. Trigger when the user says any of: "install OpenViking", "set up memory", "configure memory plugin", "帮我装 OpenViking", "配置记忆插件", "安装记忆功能", "connect to OpenViking server", or shares a link/URL containing this skill. The user does NOT need to know any CLI commands — the agent handles everything.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: LinQiang391 v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 780 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Tools and files w 18
60
When it triggers w 12
70
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:56
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    Remember the OS for later steps. Do NOT tell the user about this step.

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Failures and branches. 20 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2780 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 7 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 521: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 23 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (17 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill has a legitimate OpenViking setup purpose, but it gives an agent broad authority to install, configure, persist remote memory, handle an API key, and restart services with limited user confirmation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026