SKILLEMALL.ai

AD clawsync

Git-first backup, migration, restore, and token-protected archive serving for OpenClaw state. Highlights: complete Git-native workflow (`git init/push/pull/merge/prune-branches`), fine-grained backup scope (`include/exclude/ignore-paths/workspace-include-globs`), built-in secret sanitization pipeline, archive retention (`--keep`), remote branch pruning (`--keep-days`), and richer restore strategies (`overwrite/skip/merge`) with safe defaults.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: linsheng9731 v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 979 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store skill-card.md:24
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (detector / deny-list definition)
      Risk: Restore, pull, merge, and pruning operations can overwrite or remove important local state. <br>
      detector

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawsync) differs from the folder (clawgitsync)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 100Steps. 30 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 979 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 446: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This backup-and-restore skill is mostly coherent, but its install path runs an unreviewed remote shell script while requesting access to sensitive OpenClaw state.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026