SKILLEMALL.ai
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AI 接入付费学术数据库（IEEE/Scopus/EV/ACM）的权限桥接层。 通过浏览器 CDP 借用用户登录态，搜索→提取→去重→补摘要→评分→输出。 Zero-token abstract handling.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: lishy227 v1.1.0 MIT-0 44 files · 38 scripts body ≈ 2 247 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

AI 接入付费学术数据库（IEEE/Scopus/EV/ACM）的权限桥接层。 通过浏览器 CDP 借用用户登录态，搜索→提取→去重→补摘要→评分→输出。 Zero-token abstract handling.

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureSoftware developmentInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
39/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
21
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/utils/cookie_bridge.py:46
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    CHROME_COOKIES = os.path.join(CHROME_DATA, "Default", "Network", "Cookies")
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/utils/cookie_bridge.py:49
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    EDGE_COOKIES = os.path.join(EDGE_DATA, "Default", "Network", "Cookies")
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/utils/cookie_bridge.py:185
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    def bridge_cookies(db_names, dry_run=False, source="chrome"):
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/pipeline/ai_rerank.py:175
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/pipeline/ai_summarize.py:119
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/pipeline/theme_cluster.py:43
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/utils/cookie_bridge.py:3
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Cookie Bridge: Copy login session cookies from user's default Chrome to the
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/utils/cookie_bridge.py:66
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    """Extract the AES-256-GCM key from a Chromium browser's Local State."""
    quoted

Files scanned: 44. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 29 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2247 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 107: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -237 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is purpose-built for academic database automation, but it needs careful review because it can use logged-in browser sessions, copy cookies, store abstracts, and send paper data to external AI APIs.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 18 Jun 2026