CC phone-call-agent
AI voice call agent — make outbound calls, generate browser call links, accept inbound calls, and retrieve full transcripts + summaries when calls end. Supports Chinese and English. Self-hosted with Docker.
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
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high Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:119Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)# Prints something like: https://abc1…com
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high Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:131Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)PUBLIC_URL=https://abc1…com
Medium and low: 4
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvSKILL.md:28Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:88Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)PUBLIC_URL=https://your-tunnel.trycloudflare.com
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:101Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)│ └── returns: https://abc1…com/call/web-xxx?token=...
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlSKILL.md:146Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)→ "请点击此链接，AI 会主动跟进合同事宜：https://abc1…com/call/web-xxx?token=..."
placeholder
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 9 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1921 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 206: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 20 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
- +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.