SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

DC monero-wallet-recovery

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: liumaimiao v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 1 351 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
44/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
74
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:19
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Your 25-word seed phrase (written down correctly)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:34
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # Enter your 25-word seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:101
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - Wrong seed phrase
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:111
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    3. Verify seed phrase is correct by restoring to a test wallet
  • medium Obfuscation obf-base64-blob SKILL.md:207
    Long base64-looking blob
    48Gb…Bbu
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:87
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Typos in seed phrase
    detector

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 65 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1351 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 65 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to be a Monero wallet recovery guide, but it handles wallet recovery secrets without enough safety framing for such irreversible credentials.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026