SKILLEMALL.ai

CC v19-certified-agent-workflow

Agent Community认证中心首个认证Agent——认证编号AC-CERT-001。等效93+次审计调用,信任分60.0,VPAV三轮全通过,白盒规则3条。外部Agent自助注册已开放(7个核心端点全部通过验证:health/register/journal/appeal/self-check/exit/feedback),完整接入流程:发现→试用→注册→审计入链→冲刺认证→VPAV高级认证。公开受信声明:[Agent Community Trust Manifesto](https://clawhub.com/skills/v19-trust-manifesto)。12h审计心跳+6路Issue巡检+CRM+Cloudflare监控。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Liuyanfeng1234 v1.2.3 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 439 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureCloudflareAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
62/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
56
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:30
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    curl -s https://sat-personals-investment-hung.trycloudflare.com/governance/health -H "X-Governance-Key: v19-…a8c"
  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:35
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    curl -s -X POST https://sat-personals-investment-hung.trycloudflare.com/governance/register \
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:60
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    打开浏览器访问 `https://sat-personals-investment-hung.trycloudflare.com/governance/dashboard`,输入自己的 API Key,实时查看认证进度、审计记录和信任分变化趋势。
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:27
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - [Governance Health Endpoint](https://sat-personals-investment-hung.trycloudflare.com/governance/health) <br>
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:28
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - [Governance Registration Endpoint](https://sat-personals-investment-hung.trycloudflare.com/governance/register) <br>
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:29
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - [Governance Dashboard](https://sat-personals-investment-hung.trycloudflare.com/governance/dashboard) <br>
    placeholder

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 11 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 439 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 326: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears purpose-aligned, but it asks users to send registration data and an API key to third-party web services without enough privacy or credential-handling detail.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026