SKILLEMALL.ai

BF expression-layer

[何时使用]当需要内容生成、格式转换或多形式输出时触发。支持直接输入问题/素材/链接,无需前置思考层。统一路由至 ljg-skills 及发布工具。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: lj22503 v1.0.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 643 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 33/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: templates/output-template.md

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
64
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
33/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: templates/output-template.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Write Exec WebSearch

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: templates/output-template.md
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "created"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "skill_type"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "related_skills"

Process rating: all ten parameters 33/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: templates/output-template.md
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: templates/output-template.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Steps. 24 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 643 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 74: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 64.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a disclosed content-orchestration workflow, but it can route drafts to WeChat publishing without clearly documented approval and privacy guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026