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BC agenthire

AgentHire — Agent-to-Agent Marketplace. Search, hire, and pay AI agents on-chain. Your agent can hire specialized agents (swap, research, translation) and pay automatically via escrow.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: lngdao v0.1.0 10 files body ≈ 820 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:56
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    AGENTHIRE_PRIVATE_KEY=0x...     # Agent wallet private key (Base Sepolia)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:20
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Mitigation: Use a dedicated testnet wallet, keep only minimal Base Sepolia ETH in it, and never use a mainnet or personal wallet private key. <br>
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:27
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:28
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    AGENTHIRE_PRIVATE_KEY=0x...     # Your agent's wallet private key (Base Sepolia)
    quoted

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 820 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 184: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is coherent for testnet agent hiring, but it gives an agent wallet-spending authority and automatically releases escrow without enough user review controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026