SKILLEMALL.ai

BC CHEESE Agent Marketplace

Create, browse, accept, and complete on-chain work requests with trade deadlines and gasless relay. Agents act as requesters (posting jobs) or providers (completing work). Supports ETH/stablecoin escrow on Base with auto-expiry protection.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: locjonz v4.1.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 3 109 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, consistency, running it twice

GeneratorAI and agentsInfrastructureCommercetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:52
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    export CHEESE_PRIVATE_KEY="0x..."  # Your wallet private key
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:59
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Factory V5 (latest): `0xE2…966`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:60
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Factory V4: `0x74…b61`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:61
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Factory V3: `0x44…86A`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:62
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Factory V2: `0xf0…828`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:64
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Rewards: `0xAd…620`
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 21 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (CHEESE Agent Marketplace) differs from the folder (cheese)
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Failures and branches. 5 branches
  • 100Steps. 84 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3109 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 239: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 30 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 84 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is for a real on-chain work marketplace, but it asks users to run unaudited external code with wallet keys and money-moving authority.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026