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AC canary-deploy

Safe system changes with automatic baseline capture, canary testing, and rollback for critical infrastructure modifications. Use when making changes to SSH config, firewall rules, network settings, systemd services, kernel parameters, or any system change that could break remote access. Prevents lockouts by validating connectivity before and after changes. Born from a real incident where AllowTcpForwarding=no killed VPN tunnel access.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: lolaopenclaw v1.0.0 5 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 661 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
96/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/canary-test.sh:150
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (test fixture / example file)
      sudo cp "$f" "$ORIGINAL"
      fixture

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 24 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 661 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 438: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +3All 2 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is meant for risky infrastructure changes, but its rollback safety is overstated and the restore path can perform privileged overwrites from local backup metadata.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026