SKILLEMALL.ai

BD my-lark

飞书全能力技能。基于飞书官方工具服务,支持消息、群组、云文档、云盘、知识库、日历、审批、多维表格、电子表格、画板、通讯录全部模块。面向小白:安装即用,每一步都有操作指引;面向AI:每个接口均有调用示例、参数说明、权限要求和异常处理。触发词:发消息、搜索文档、查日历、查审批、建日程、拉群列表等。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: LONGSASASASASA v3.0.0 MIT-0 17 files body ≈ 3 227 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
84
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token lark_mcp.py:11
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    APP_SECRET = "bHTI…VTZ"
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lark_mcp.py:11
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    APP_SECRET = "bHTI…VTZ"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/bitable.md:9
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    python3 /workspace/skills/lark-skill/lark_mcp.py call bita…ist '{"page_size":100}'
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/bitable.md:19
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    bita…ate list update delete search - 记录
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/bitable.md:20
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    bita…ist create update delete - 字段
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/tools-index.md:24
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    driv…ate - 添加文件协作者
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/tools-index.md:25
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    driv…ist - 获取协作者列表
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/tools-index.md:53
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    bita…ate - 新增记录
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/tools-index.md:54
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    bita…ist - 获取记录列表
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/tools-index.md:55
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    bita…ate - 更新记录
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:278
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    python3 /workspace/skills/lark-skill/lark_mcp.py call bita…ist '{
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:284
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    python3 /workspace/skills/lark-skill/lark_mcp.py call bita…ate '{

Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 9 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3227 tokens
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -217 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 147: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 38 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
  • +4Has examples (25 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (14 of 14)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Feishu/Lark skill mostly matches its stated purpose, but it embeds an app secret and exposes broad business-data actions without enough scoping or credential safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026