SKILLEMALL.ai

AC identity

UserPool login, TIP token, credential hosting, and tool risk approval. Activate when user needs to check identity (whoami/status), log in, list/add credentials, manage env bindings, configure the plugin, or diagnose/approve risky tool calls. Also activates for: 用户说登录、查身份、获取凭据、添加/配置API密钥、绑定环境变量、配置插件、审批工具调用、风险检查.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: M1a0 v0.2.1 2 files body ≈ 3 463 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:68
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - **Rule-based**: Destructive patterns (rm -rf, sudo, curl|bash), sensitive paths (/etc, ~/.ssh).
      detector

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (identity) differs from the folder (volcengine-agent-identity)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3463 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 312: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This identity skill is mostly coherent, but it gives agents a documented path to receive raw credential values and persist environment secrets, so users should review it carefully before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026