SKILLEMALL.ai

CD Amber_Url_to_Markdown

智能 URL 转 Markdown 工具(V4.0 可扩展架构)。**支持自动触发 Hook**,当用户发送 URL 链接时自动抓取内容并转换为 Markdown 格式。采用可扩展的分类处理架构,支持豆包、微信公众号、知乎、掘金等网站。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Amber03 v4.0.2 MIT-0 43 files · 19 scripts body ≈ 882 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

智能 URL 转 Markdown 工具(V4.0 可扩展架构)。支持自动触发 Hook,当用户发送 URL 链接时自动抓取内容并转换为 Markdown 格式。采用可扩展的分类处理架构,支持豆包、微信公众号、知乎、掘金等网站。

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubPlaywrightSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
96
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/amber_url_to_markdown_v4.py:101
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/amber_url_to_markdown_v4.py:114
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/amber_url_to_markdown.py:103
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/amber_url_to_markdown.py:123
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal

Files scanned: 39. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Amber_Url_to_Markdown) differs from the folder (amber-url-to-markdown)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 36 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 882 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 118: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -38 of 9 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill's stated purpose (convert URLs to Markdown) matches the code, but the Hook-based auto-trigger, instructions to persist cookies / inject authentication into scripts, and lack of declared config/path requirements create privacy and operational risks that users should understand before enabling.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 27 Mar 2026