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CD Amber_Url_to_Markdown

智能 URL 转 Markdown 工具（V4.0 可扩展架构）。**支持自动触发 Hook**，当用户发送 URL 链接时自动抓取内容并转换为 Markdown 格式。采用可扩展的分类处理架构，支持豆包、微信公众号、知乎、掘金等网站。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Amber03 v4.0.3 MIT-0 44 files · 1 script body ≈ 882 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
71/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
78
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store skill-card.md:23
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Mitigation: Avoid storing Doubao cookies or pasting Cookie headers unless the operator understands the account-access risk and can remove saved profiles and output files afterward. <br>
Medium and low: 4
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/amber_url_to_markdown_v4.py:101
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/amber_url_to_markdown_v4.py:114
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/amber_url_to_markdown.py:103
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/amber_url_to_markdown.py:123
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal

Files scanned: 40. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Amber_Url_to_Markdown) differs from the folder (amber-url-to-markdown)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 36 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 882 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 118: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -38 of 9 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This URL-to-Markdown skill is mostly coherent, but its optional auto-trigger hook can run shell commands from crafted chat URLs and it retains authenticated browser state for some sites.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026