BB ttc
Real-time Toronto transit — bus & streetcar arrivals, vehicle tracking, alerts, stop search
As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:64High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…SzS+cfgl…B0A==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:89High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha512-j+gKEx…ahh+s1F2HZ+wAce…RkU++ZWQr…uoQ==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:135High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…rvP+yUUf…4tH/iSSo…tEA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:175High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…ZiR+BeGu…dXd+qTiw==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:184High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…GD3+82K6JgJlm/Y+KI92…no5+4jh9sw==",
detector
Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 6 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 806 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 91: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -33 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.