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AB autonomy-windowed

Time-windowed autonomous task queue. Autonomy works only during specific time windows (e.g., 8 AM - 8 PM UTC), while cron jobs run overnight. Separates concerns by time - day = autonomy, night = maintenance. Use when you want predictable work schedule, controlled token budget, and clear temporal separation between autonomous work and scheduled maintenance.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: luciusrockwing v1.0.0 7 files body ≈ 2 424 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
71/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
50
Failures and branches w 10
55
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump templates/HEARTBEAT.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      templates/HEARTBEAT.md

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 85Steps. 65 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2424 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 358: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 30 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 65 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This instruction-only skill is not malware, but it needs review because it gives an agent broad scheduled autonomy, off-hours urgent overrides, and persistent memory/goal-writing behavior without clear safety boundaries.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026