SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC psd-batch-export

Production PSD batch workflow for analyzing PSD text layers, mapping Excel/CSV data to editable layers, previewing, exporting editable PSD plus PNG batches, validating results, checking fonts/OCR dependencies, and using built-in PSD templates for tickets, certificates, invitations, badges, posters, daily cards, and recruitment assets. Use whenever the user mentions PSD, Photoshop templates, layer text replacement, batch image generation, Excel-driven design output, PSD analysis, print-ready PNG export, or OpenClaw/Claude/Codex skill packaging for PSD automation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Luisclaw v4.4.2 MIT-0 26 files body ≈ 939 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 21 h ago

Production PSD batch workflow for analyzing PSD text layers, mapping Excel/CSV data to editable layers, previewing, exporting editable PSD plus PNG batches…

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedurePhotoshopExcelData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/design_llm.py:47
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash

    Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 49): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 939 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • -37 of 13 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 568: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a coherent local PSD batch-export skill, with some privacy and scoping cautions but no artifact-backed malicious behavior.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 6 Jun 2026