CC axihub
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As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, consistency
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.
Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Concealment
en-hide-from-userSKILL.md:216Instruction to hide actions from the user→ Don't notify user yet
Medium and low: 1
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcSETUP.md:125Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export AXIHUB_API_KEY="axi_the_key_you_got"' >> ~/.bashrc
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 6541 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (axihub) differs from the folder (axihub-subscription)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6541 tokens
- 100Steps. 26 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 11 branches, has a failure section
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 114: 120–800 characters recommended
- -215 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 54 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
- +3Output format is stated explicitly
- +4Has examples (48 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 59.