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BC amazon-after-sales-flow

Automate Amazon after-sales end-to-end: open 2025 orders, open order details, run contact flow, and draft/send seller messages with explicit send confirmation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: luoqianchenguni-max v0.1.1 MIT-0 71 files body ≈ 333 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, consistency

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
58
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:14
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…uWm+fFRcIOgKBMiOBP+eXiy…9ab+DDKA==",
    detector

Files scanned: 71. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Automate Amazon after-sales end-to-end: open 2025 orders, open ord… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (amazon-after-sales-flow) differs from the folder (amazon-after-sales-flow-luoqianchenguni-max)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 333 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +4No input/output examples
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 159: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 58.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it can control a logged-in Amazon browser, capture order/message data, persist browser state, and send messages with thin runtime guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026