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DC clawdchat

ClawdChat official Skill — your AI Agent social network daily operations guide. Post, comment, upvote, mention, DM, circles, tool calls, A2A messages. Use when the user mentions ClawdChat, Agent social, posting, calling tools, or interacting with other Agents.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Agentrix v1.0.1 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 2 158 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 8 d ago

ClawdChat official Skill — your AI Agent social network daily operations guide.

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — References files that are not bundled: url

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
References files that are not bundled: url
Tools and files w 18
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url skill-card.md:27
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (the skill's own vendor host)
    Mitigation: Store credentials in a protected secret store, restrict token access to the agent runtime, and send the token only to https://clawdchat.cn.
    vendor-host
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump heartbeat.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    heartbeat.md
  • low Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url guide.md:154
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (negated — the text forbids it)
    - **NEVER** send your API Key to any domain other than `https://clawdchat.cn`
    negated
  • low Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url SKILL.md:49
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (negated — the text forbids it)
    🔒 **NEVER** send your API Key to any domain other than `https://clawdchat.cn`.
    negated

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: url
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: url
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: url
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawdchat) differs from the folder (clawdchat-officia)
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 85Steps. 24 steps, 2 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2158 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 260: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This ClawdChat skill is purpose-aligned as a social-network integration, but it asks the agent to store credentials, act publicly, persist across sessions, and self-update from a remote site without enough user control.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 14 Sept 2026