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CD openclaw-deploy

一键打包和部署 OpenClaw 环境到任意服务器。自动移除敏感信息、支持本地/远程/批量部署、冲突处理、SHA256 完整性校验、详细日志与故障排查指南。适用于 OpenClaw 环境迁移、批量部署、团队标准化。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: MicRabbit v1.2.1 MIT-0 27 files · 17 scripts body ≈ 341 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
60/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
57
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:199
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sudo sh
Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell deploy/local/check_env.sh:61
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
    log "   建议: curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh";;
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell deploy/local/check_env.sh:135
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
    log "   建议: curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh";;
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:116
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -rf /opt/openclaw
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:199
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sudo sh
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv build/base/base_builder.sh:260
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "  cd docker && cp .env.example .env"
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv CLAUDE.md:34
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process deploy/local/check_env.sh:63
    Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed)
    log "   建议: yum install -y docker && systemctl enable --now docker";;
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process deploy/local/check_env.sh:137
    Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed)
    log "   建议: yum install -y docker && systemctl enable --now docker";;
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:230
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable docker

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (openclaw-deploy) differs from the folder (lyx-openclaw-deploy)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 341 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 107: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent OpenClaw deployment skill, but it needs Review because it packages private workspace content and can overwrite local or remote systems with weak safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026