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FD openclaw-rescue-kit

OpenClaw 自救套件 - 网关启动包装（端口冲突防护）、看门狗监控、自动重启、配置回滚、安全加固、日志清理、Git版本管理。当用户提到 OpenClaw 网关崩溃、需要看门狗、配置回滚、安全扫描、日志清理、端口冲突、或部署自救脚本时使用此技能。包含 10 个独立脚本和完整部署指南。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Syfy v1.11.0 14 files · 10 scripts body ≈ 1 357 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructureSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
32/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 25

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:73
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cp ~/.openclaw/launchagents-ready/*.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:74
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.*.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/guide.md:201
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.watchdog.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/guide.md:204
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.watchdog.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/guide.md:205
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.watchdog.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/gateway-watchdog.sh:250
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$plist" 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-rescue-kit.sh:180
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    if launchctl load "$dst" 2>/dev/null; then
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-rescue-kit.sh:215
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    current_crontab=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null || echo "")
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-rescue-kit.sh:239
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (echo "$current_crontab"; echo "$cron_entries") | crontab -
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:91
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cp ~/.openclaw/launchagents-ready/*.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:94
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.watchdog.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:95
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.healthcheck.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:96
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.logcleaner.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:97
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gittag.plist
Medium and low: 11
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/core.sh:65
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot$TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage" \
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/gateway-watchdog.sh:246
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    local plist="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-rescue-kit.sh:200
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo -e "${BOLD}launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.*.plist${NC}"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-rescue-kit.sh:246
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    local plist="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/notify.sh:101
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    if curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot$TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage" \
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/guide.md:216
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention references/guide.md:219
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/core.sh:65
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot$TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage" \
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/install-rescue-kit.sh:215
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    current_crontab=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null || echo "")
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/notify.sh:101
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    if curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot$TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage" \
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:132
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 20 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1357 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 144: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 17 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 10 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real OpenClaw rescue toolkit, but it needs review because it can keep running in the background and make high-impact local changes.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026