SKILLEMALL.ai

BC Skill Security Scanner

Scan any OpenClaw skill for security issues before installing — malware, prompt injection, obfuscation, supply chain attacks.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Blossom v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 341 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 5 d ago

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ReferenceSecurityInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Glob Grep
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:30
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    1. **Malware Detection** — Suspicious shell commands, destructive operations, credential harvesting
    detector

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Skill Security Scanner) differs from the folder (claws-security-scanner)
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 341 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 125: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 5 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This appears to be a straightforward skill-security scanner, with the main caveat that it runs an external npm scanner package.
LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026