AB agentvault
Encrypted credential vault and persistent memory for AI agents. Install from npm, sandbox agent access to secrets, store and query encrypted memory, run an MCP server, and audit every credential access. Use when the user mentions agentvault, credential sandboxing, secret management for agents, encrypted memory, or wants to control what an agent can see.
As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 42 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3471 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 355: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 24 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
- +4Has examples (17 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.