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DD fast-browser-use

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Makforce v1.0.0 71 files body ≈ 1 510 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 38/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
52/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
64
Quality 40%
33
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
38/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store src/bin/cli.rs:132
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    cookies: Vec<headless_chrome::protocol::cdp::Network::Cookie>,
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store src/browser/session.rs:346
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    pub fn get_cookies(&self) -> Result<Vec<headless_chrome::protocol::cdp::Network::Cookie>> {

Files scanned: 61. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "emoji"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "primaryEnv"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "os"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "install"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "config"

Process rating: all ten parameters 38/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (fast-browser-use) differs from the folder (fast-browser-use-1-0-5)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 26 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1510 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 33.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real browser automation skill, but it promotes bot-detection bypass and session reuse while exposing powerful browser, cookie, page-capture, and file-write capabilities without clear safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026