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BB envy

Use when the user asks about crypto indicators, trading signals, backtesting strategies, portfolio optimization, market analysis, starting/stopping the trading monitor, managing positions, checking P&L, configuring risk rules, switching between paper and live trading, or their wallet (mnemonic, private key, seed phrase, MetaMask import, connect wallet). Provides 85M+ data points across technical, social, and chaos indicators for 40+ coins. Score signals with 365-day backtests, assemble optimal strategies via tournament, optimize portfolios by correlation, open signal packs with rarity tiers. Monitors live signals via WebSocket, manages positions with risk rules, and routes trades to paper or Hyperliquid executors. Auto-saves signals and strategies to organized directories. Supports subscription (credits) and x402 micropayments.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: manolovni v1.0.2 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 3 573 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerInfrastructureFinancetype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:183
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      When the user asks for their mnemonic, private key, seed phrase, wants to import to MetaMask, connect their wallet, or anything wallet-related:
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token envy.js:13
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      const USDC_ADDRESS = '0xaf…831';
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:3
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      description: "Use when the user asks about crypto indicators, trading signals, backtesting strategies, portfolio optimization, market analysis, starting/stopping the trading monitor, managing position
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:195
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      - To add USDC: Import Token → paste `0xaf…831`
      detector

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 59 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3573 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 839: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 32 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 59 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (22 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a real crypto trading skill, but it stores wallet secrets in plaintext and can use them for live trading with limited runtime safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026