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Scrape Hacker News stories, comments, and discussions. Use when user asks to search HN, find Hacker News posts, monitor tech discussions, or extract HN data. Requires APIFY_TOKEN environment variable.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Marcin Dudek v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 377 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 10

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 10
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url skill-card.md:27
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      - [Apify Actor synchronous dataset endpoint](https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/0UDO…c90/run-sync-get-dataset-items?token=…) <br>
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url skill-card.md:28
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      - [Apify Actor run endpoint](https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/0UDO…c90/runs?token=…) <br>
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:29
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/0UDO…c90/run-sync-get-dataset-items?token=…" \
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:29
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/0UDO…c90/run-sync-get-dataset-items?token=…" \
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:37
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      RUN_ID=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/0UDO…c90/runs?token=…" \
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:37
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      RUN_ID=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/0UDO…c90/runs?token=…" \
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:40
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      curl -s "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID?token=…" | jq -r '.data.status'
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:40
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID?token=…" | jq -r '.data.status'
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:41
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      curl -s "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=…" | jq '.'
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:41
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=…" | jq '.'
      vendor-host

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 8 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 377 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 200: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a narrow Hacker News scraping helper that uses Apify as expected, with no evidence of hidden persistence, destructive behavior, or unrelated access.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026