SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC whatsapp-business-ai

Automates WhatsApp conversations for local businesses — replies, bookings, lead capture, and follow-ups. Designed for gyms, restaurants, salons, clinics, and service-based businesses.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: marcvanstad v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 895 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureWhatsAppInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url reference/config/business.yaml:54
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    escalation_webhook: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/..."
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url-exfil-host SKILL.md:87
    Credential sent in a URL query string to a known exfiltration host (placeholder value)
    -d "object=whatsapp_business_account&callback_url=https://your-ngrok-url.ngrok.io/webhook&verify_token=…"
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:87
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    -d "object=whatsapp_business_account&callback_url=https://your-ngrok-url.ngrok.io/webhook&verify_token=…"
    placeholder

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1895 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 183: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This WhatsApp automation skill is not malware, but it needs Review because it can store customer chats, book appointments, send follow-ups, and share details with other services without enough consent and retention guidance.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026